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Technology is unavoidable in today’s world.  It surrounds us daily; most of 
our lives require technology in some way or another.  But even as society’s 
reliance increases, privacy laws lag behind.1  As a result, certain technologies 
are especially vulnerable to warrantless searches, such as cloud stored 
information.2  Federal law, in the form of the Stored Communications Act 
(SCA), provides little safety for cloud data.3  And the Fourth Amendment may 
not be any better.4 
Although the Fourth Amendment shelters citizens’ “homes, papers, and 
effects” from warrantless searches and seizures, the Supreme Court’s third-party 
doctrine, which allows for “warrantless searches and seizures of information 
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 1. Eric Johnson, Note, Lost in the Cloud: Cloud Storage, Privacy, and Suggestions for 
Protecting Users’ Data, 69 STAN. L. REV. 867, 870 (2017). 
 2. H. Brian Holland, A Cognitive Theory of the Third-Party Doctrine and Digital Papers, 
91 TEMP. L. REV. 55, 64 (2018). 
 3. Johnson, supra note 1, at 877–78. 
 4. Holland, supra note 2, at 75. 
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entrusted to third parties,” may overcome any constitutional protection afforded 
to cloud stored data.5  When the Supreme Court established this doctrine in the 
1970s, commercial cloud storage was not even a thought, let alone a reality.6  
More than 40 years later, cloud storage might be an extension of everyday 
society.7  Citizens’ most intimate information—from medical records to 
business documents—is stored on these servers.8  As a result, broad application 
of the third-party doctrine by the government is an ever-growing concern. 
If the third-party doctrine applies to cloud services, the government could 
obtain personal files with a simple subpoena or court order.9  To obtain a 
subpoena, little evidence is required and, there is no judicial oversight; as long 
as internal policies are followed, the subpoena will generally be granted.10  A 
court order requires judicial consent, but it still does not rise to the evidentiary 
level of warrants; a warrant requires probable cause and particularity—both of 
which a judge reviews.11 
One does not have to work for the government to understand the myriad of 
“potential benefits of such [unencumbered] digital investigations.”12  Take your 
own cloud storage as an example.  It probably contains photos, documents, and 
medical files—your “entire digital life.”13  This amount of information would 
take minutes to collect with a simple download; a standard investigation 
collecting this information could take years.  For agencies that want to solve 
crimes quickly, what better way than to search a personal cloud account?14 
In the coming years, there will be no shortage of third-party doctrine cases 
involving cloud services: “16 percent of Americans own a smart speaker” (e.g., 
                                                 
 5. Johnson, supra note 1, at 871; Aaron J. Gold, Obscured by Clouds: The Fourth 
Amendment and Searching Cloud Storage Accounts Through Locally Installed Software, 56 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 2321, 2322 (2015). 
 6. 2006: Storage in the Cloud, THE STORAGE ENGINE (Sept. 11, 2015), 
https://www.computerhistory.org/storageengine/storage-in-the-cloud/. 
 7. Eunice Park, Objects, Places and Cyber-Spaces Post-Carpenter: Extending the Third-
Party Doctrine Beyond CSLI: A Consideration of IoT and DNA, 21 YALE J. L. & TECH. 1, 16 
(2019); Holland, supra note 2, at 73–77. 
 8. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018). 
 9. Vania Mia Chaker, Your Spying Smartphone: Individual Privacy is Narrowly 
Strengthened in Carpenter v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court’s Most Recent Fourth 
Amendment Ruling, 23 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 13–14 (2018). 
 10. Id. at 14. 
 11. Dylan Bonfigli, Note, Get A Warrant: A Bright-Line Rule for Digital Searches Under the 
Private-Search Doctrine, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 312 (2017); Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy 
in the Criminal Justice System: Information Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law 
Enforcement Exemptions, 111 MICH. L. REV. 485, 518 (2013). 
 12. Chaker, supra note 9, at 13. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
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Amazon Echo),15 81% of Americans own a smartphone,16 over 500 million 
people are actively using Dropbox,17 and Google Drive currently boasts one 
billion users.18  Because all these devices or programs use cloud-based systems, 
the third-party doctrine could possibly be used to access their cloud data.19 
As cases start to emerge, courts will turn to the recent Supreme Court case 
Carpenter v. United States for guidance.20  Carpenter addressed two issues: a 
person’s reasonable expectation of privacy in cell-site location information 
(CSLI) and the application of the third-party doctrine to obtain this 
information.21  For Fourth Amendment protections to exist in cloud information, 
“users must have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cloud stored 
data.”22  For brevity, this paper will assume that this requirement is met and only 
focus on the third-party doctrine. 23 
This Paper argues that the third-party doctrine does not apply to cloud data, 
and that a warrant is necessary to search and seize information stored in the 
cloud.  To arrive at this conclusion, it first analyzed the Supreme Court’s creation 
of the third-party doctrine and its subsequent evolution.  The second part outlines 
cloud storage and data.  The third part discusses why cloud data should be secure 
from warrantless searches.  Lastly, this Paper explains why Congress needs to 
legislate this issue—not the Courts—and offers recommendations on how to do 
so. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Carpenter 
Since the Supreme Court issued its opinion on Carpenter, it has received 
significant attention from legal scholars and for good reason.  The Court’s 
                                                 
 15. Sarah Perez, 39 Million Americans Now Own a Smart Speaker, Report Claims, TECH 
CRUNCH (Dec. 1, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/01/12/39-million-americans-now-own-a-
smart-speaker-report-claims/. 
 16. Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.pewinternet.org/fact-
sheet/mobile/. 
 17. Trefis Team, Dropbox is Doing Well, But Looks Rich in the Face of Industry Headwinds, 
FORBES (May 21, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2018/05/21/dropbox-is-
doing-well-but-looks-rich-in-the-face-of-industry-headwinds/#2beab95e36ed. 
 18. Shoshana Wodinsky, Google Drive is About to Hit 1 Billion Users, THE VERGE (July 25, 
2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/7/25/17613442/google-drive-one-billion-users. 
 19. Rob Thubron, Apple Served with Search Warrant to Access Texas Shooter’s iPhone, 
iCloud Account, TECHSPOT (Nov. 19, 2017), https://www.techspot.com/news/71947-apple-
%20served-search-warrant-access-texas-shooter-iphone.html. 
 20. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 21. Park, supra note 7, at 11–12. 
 22. Johnson, supra note 1, at 885. 
 23. Id. at 885–86; Gold, supra note 5, at 56 (Because Carpenter held that Carpenter did have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy for his CSLI, the Court likely would not find cloud storage 
users lacking this right.). 
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analysis revolutionized the third-party doctrine.  This doctrine no longer consists 
of three elements but several other factors that some have argued narrow its 
application.24  To be sure, the Court itself characterized Carpenter as a “narrow” 
decision.25  But a narrow ruling should not be conflated with narrow 
consequences; Carpenter’s extension is likely far greater than most realize.26 
1.  Technological Background 
At its core, Carpenter is about location information provided by cell phones 
to cell-sites.27  Cell phones are continuously searching for the best signal, which 
is why they generally connect to the closest cell-site.28  Modern phones 
constantly search for cell-sites even when the owner is not using the phone; all 
that is required is for the phone be turned on.29  When a cell phone connects to 
a cell-site, “it generates a time-stamped record known as cell-site location 
information (CSLI).”30  The more location information produced, the easier it is 
to determine someone’s location.31  Although phone companies create, collect, 
and store CSLI for their own business purposes, Carpenter explained how the 
government can use this information in criminal investigations.32 
2.  Factual Background 
In 2011, the FBI arrested four men for a string of local robberies.33  After 
being questioned by the FBI, a defendant confessed and turned over his 15 
accomplices.34  The FBI then reviewed this defendant’s call records to identify 
other possible suspects.35  From this evidence, the FBI learned of several other 
suspects, including Timothy Carpenter.36 
Using this information, prosecutors obtained Carpenter’s CSLI through the 
Store Communications Act (SCA), “which authorizes courts to grant orders for 
telecommunications records.”37  This particular section of the SCA requires a 
higher standard of proof than a subpoena but less than a warrant.38  When served 
                                                 
 24. Chaker, supra note 9, at 17. 
      25.    Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018). 
 26. Park, supra note 7, at 13; Chaker, supra note 9, at 17. 
 27. Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2211–12. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 2211. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 2211–12. 
 32. Id. at 2212. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id.; Mihailis E. Diamantis, Privileging Privacy: Confidentiality as a Source of Fourth 
Amendment Protection, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 485, 533–34 (2018). 
 38. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2210. 
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with this court order, Carpenter’s wireless carriers provided CSLI for the 
specific “four-month period when the string of robberies occurred.”39  This 
information helped prove that Carpenter was near the robberies when they 
occurred; although his CSLI could only show his whereabouts “between a half 
mile and two mile” radius.40  That said, the FBI used this evidence to charge 
Carpenter with aiding and abetting robbery.41 
Carpenter argued that the warrantless seizure of his CSLI violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights, and that the evidence should have been suppressed.42  Both 
lower courts rejected this argument, and the appellate court explained that when 
Carpenter shared his CSLI to these third-parties, he waived any Fourth 
Amendment rights attached to the information.43 
3.  Majority Opinion44 
In Carpenter, the sole issue was whether the government violated the Fourth 
Amendment when it accessed Carpenter’s CSLI without a warrant.45  Although 
CSLI is held by a third-party, the Court explained that the “unique nature” of 
this information outweighed this outside control.46  For this reason, the Court 
held that Carpenter’s CSLI still possessed Fourth Amendment protections.47  
How the Court arrived at this conclusion is what matters for future third-party 
doctrine cases. 
Carpenter discussed the third-party doctrine at length and reconfigured its 
meaning.48  But before one can understand how Carpenter changed this doctrine, 
the two cases that helped create it must be considered: United States v. Miller49 
and Smith v. Maryland.50 
Miller established the third-party doctrine.51  It held that once an individual 
voluntarily turned over documents to a bank—they became the bank’s business 
records—and a constitutional privacy interest ceased to exist in the documents.52  
Once the bank had these records, they were used in the bank’s “ordinary course 
                                                 
 39. Id. at 2212. 
 40. Id. at 2212–13, 2225 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 41. Id. at 2212. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Susan Freiwald & Stephen Wm. Smith, The Carpenter Chronicle: A Near-Perfect 
Surveillance, 132 HARV. L. REV. 205, 217–18 (2018). 
 44. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2206, 2211. 
 45. Id. at 2212. 
 46. Id. at 2217. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 2216–17, 2219–22. 
 49. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 50. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 51. Miller, 425 U.S. at 444. 
 52. Id. 
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of business.”53  Important to Miller’s analysis was that the bank was not simply 
an intermediary for these transactions but a necessary party.54  And the 
documents, which were created for commercial transactions, underscored 
Miller’s reduced expectation of privacy.55 
Miller’s belief that the documents would be “used only for a limited purpose” 
did not help him reclaim his lost Fourth Amendment protections.56  When Miller 
voluntarily exposed his information to the bank, he assumed the risk that the 
bank would provide the information to the government.57  Thus, he no longer 
held an expectation of privacy in the documents.58 
Smith59 applied the same doctrine a few years later.  In Smith, the government 
used a pen register to record phone numbers dialed on a landline telephone.60  
The Court ruled that the third-party doctrine applied, and that this action did not 
constitute a search.61  Telephone users generally know that dialed numbers are 
conveyed to phone companies and recorded for “legitimate business 
purposes.”62  In like manner, most people are aware of pen registers’ existence 
and functions.63  Smith also explained that the technology used here by law 
enforcement provided only “limited capabilities”; they could only access the 
numbers dialed, not the content of the call, limiting the information gathered to 
the parties’ identities.64  As a result, Smith did not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in his dialed phone numbers.65 
In short, Miller and Smith applied a doctrine that allows the government to 
obtain information without a warrant from a third-party if: “(1) information [is] 
voluntarily disclosed (2) for use by a third-party (3) in its normal course of 
business.”66  Until Carpenter, if these elements were met, the third-party 
doctrine could apply.67  But Carpenter not only expanded the meaning of some 
of the original elements, it also created new factors for consideration. 
                                                 
 53. Id. at 442–43. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 443. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 60. Id. at 737. 
 61. Id. at 742–44. 
 62. Id. at 743 (“Telephone users, in sum, typically know that they must convey numerical 
information to the phone company; that the phone company has facilities for recording this 
information; and that the phone company does in fact record this information for a variety of 
legitimate business purposes.”). 
 63. Id. at 742. 
 64. Id. at 742–43. 
 65. Id. at 744. 
 66. Johnson, supra note 1, at 883. 
 67. Id. 
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Because Carpenter revealed his location to his wireless providers, the 
government argued that the third-party doctrine provided access to this 
information.68  Undeniably, Carpenter provided information to a third-party, his 
wireless carriers, which used this information in their normal course of 
business.69  For that reason, the second and third elements were met.70  But the 
Court reasoned that Carpenter did not voluntarily share this information, failing 
the first element of the third-party doctrine.71  As part of its analysis of this 
element, Carpenter focused on the essential role of cell phones in today’s society 
and Carpenter’s awareness of how wireless carriers collected CSLI.72 
Cell phones are integral to modern society.73  People use cell phones for many 
reasons: to set their calendars, to work on documents, to call co-workers, friends, 
and family.74  Without cell phones, people would not have meaningful 
participation in society.75  And because of this essentialness, the owner is 
stripped of a voluntary choice on whether to own a cell phone; by extension, the 
owner does not voluntarily share his CSLI either.76 
Awareness shared a similar fate.  As long as a cell phone is on, it will 
continuously connect to local cell-sites.77  So the only affirmative act necessary 
to create CSLI is turning the phone on.78  And the only way to avoid CSLI 
collection is to disconnect the phone from the network.79  Carpenter explained 
that users do not intentionally turn over “a comprehensive dossier of [their] 
physical movements” by the simple act of leaving their phone on.80  Unlike 
Miller and Smith’s affirmative acts that provided the information, the wireless 
carriers in Carpenter received the information automatically following a simple, 
unrelated act.81  Turning a phone on does not create an awareness that CSLI is 
being collected; it is generally understood that bank documents are used for 
commercial transactions and phone providers record phone numbers for 
business purposes.82 
                                                 
 68. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216–17 (2018). 
 69. Id. at 2217. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 2220.  The United States is home to 70 million more cell phone accounts than people. 
Id. at 2211. 
 72. Id. at 2220. 
 73. Id. at 2218. 
 74. Id. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 75. Id. at 2220. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
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Carpenter did not only rely on the original elements of the third-party doctrine 
to reach its conclusion.83  As the Court explained, although a reduced 
constitutional expectation of privacy exists when “information [is] knowingly 
shared with another,” this fact is not dispositive in third-party cases.84  Carpenter 
established three new third-party factors: (1) the scope of the personal 
information accessed, (2) the nature of the information accessed, and (3) the 
technological features of the respective technology.85 
Carpenter’s scope of information exceeds the information at issue in previous 
Supreme Court third-party doctrine cases.  Miller and Smith granted access to 
“limited types of personal information.”86  But Carpenter’s CSLI provided a 
window not only into the defendant’s location but also his personal life.87  
Smith’s landline provider could only record the numbers dialed; through CSLI, 
wireless providers not only receive the numbers dialed by the user but also a 
“detailed and comprehensive record of the person’s movements.”88  With a few 
inferences, where someone travels can provide insight into their “familial, 
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”89  And because a cell 
phone is basically an extension of the human body—it travels everywhere.90 
But the scope of information is not confined to present movements or 
associations.91  Wireless carriers maintain CSLI for up to five years, which 
provides a retrospective surveillance no other technology or person can offer.92  
And if this information is properly interpreted, the government can learn a 
person’s past, present—and maybe—future movements.93  Although not the 
equivalent of the surveillance in George Orwell’s “1984,”94 this development is 
still concerning.95 
The second factor examined the nature of the information that Carpenter 
provided his wireless carriers.96  Carpenter noted that “CSLI is an entirely 
different species of business record” than the bank documents in Miller or the 
                                                 
 83. Id. at 2219 (“In mechanically applying the third-party doctrine to this case, the 
Government fails to appreciate that there are no comparable limitations on the revealing nature of 
CSLI.”). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Holland, supra note 2, at 97. 
 86. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 2217. 
 89. Id. at 2217. 
 90. Id. at 2218. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See generally GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949). 
 95. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 (“Only the few without cell phones could escape this tireless 
and absolute surveillance.”). 
 96. Holland, supra note 2, at 97. 
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phone log in Smith.97  Both Miller and Smith revealed little identifying 
information, and Smith revealed no content .98  But CSLI provides sensitive and 
revealing information—a window into the “privacies of life.”99  Simply put, an 
exhaustive location record is quite different than a few bank documents or a 
phone log.100 
Carpenter’s last factor focused on the technology behind CSLI.101  The pen 
register in Smith provided limited capabilities; the police could see the number 
dialed, but the content remained private.102  In contrast, the government in 
Carpenter could deduce Carpenter’s location and associations with his CSLI.103  
And soon CSLI will be able to pinpoint one’s location, like GPS.104  Moreover, 
this technology allows continuous monitoring when a phone is on; a pen register 
only collects information when a phone call is made.105  Lastly, CSLI’s 
technology provides access to this information in a “remarkably easy, cheap, and 
efficient [manner] compared to traditional investigative tools.”106  Information 
that would usually take years to gather can be obtained in minutes—at 
essentially no cost.107 
The Court’s focus on these new factors suggests that it felt uncomfortable 
extending this doctrine to exceedingly personal and revealing information.108  
But even though Carpenter held that the FBI needed a warrant to obtain the 
CSLI, it also warned that this decision was a narrow one.109  Depending on how 
future courts interpret this holding, warrantless searches of cloud storage 
accounts could be possible. 
B.  Cloud Storage 
Cloud storage provides users with the ability to upload files through the 
internet and store them offsite in a third-party owned and operated server.110  
Storage services, such as Dropbox or Google Drive, require users to create an 
account before uploading their files.111  Once files are uploaded, they will remain 
                                                 
 97. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2222. 
 98. Id. at 2219. 
 99. Id. at 2217–19; Holland, supra note 2, at 97. 
 100. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219. 
 101. Holland, supra note 2, at 97. 
 102. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219. 
 103. Id. at 2217. 
 104. Id. at 2217–18. 
 105. Id. at 2217. 
 106. Id. at 2217–2218. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 2217–19; Chaker, supra note 9, at 10. 
 109. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. 
 110. Johnson, supra note 1, at 872. 
 111. Id. at 892. 
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on the servers as long as the account remains active.112  Some providers also 
allow users to edit, share, and copy their files on the cloud, providing a cloud 
computing component.113 
Although most cloud services are password protected, most lack 
encryption.114  Password protection still permits storage providers to access the 
information.115  And even if the service offers an encryption option, encryption 
does not always provide absolute protection.  Data can still be backed up on 
other servers, which would allow the provider to access the information.116  If 
the provider does so, depending on the terms of service, it may collect or scan 
the information for “business purposes.”117 
The information collected from stored files comes from two main sources: 
data and metadata.118  To illustrate, consider a Word document.  The words 
within the document are data; the “origin, purpose, time, geographic location, 
creator, access, and terms of use of the data” are all metadata.119  In essence, 
metadata is “data about data.”120  As metadata increases over time, it “can be 
more telling than the content” of the respective files.121  Metadata can reveal a 
“detailed account of one’s interests, activities, and associations.”122  And even if 
a file is deleted, the “deleted data still remains in the cloud for a certain period 
of time.”123 
Some service providers also collect other information not associated with 
uploaded files.124  This information includes the previous website visited before 
using the cloud service, “the device and software used to access the service,” 
and the searches within the cloud program.125  This information coupled with 
                                                 
 112. Id. at 873. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 873–74. 
 116. Johnson, supra note 1, at 873–74. 
 117. Holland, supra note 2, at 73–75; Johnson, supra note 1, at 873–74. 
 118. Michael W. Price, Rethinking Privacy: Fourth Amendment “Papers” and the Third-Party 
Doctrine, 8 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 247, 274–75 (2016). 
 119. Data Documentation and Metadata, U. ARIZ. LIB., https://data.library.arizona.edu/data-
management-tips/data-documentation-and-metadata  (last visited Mar. 7, 2020). 
 120. Thomas H. White, Parol Metadata: New Boilerplate Merger Clauses and the 
Admissibility of Metadata Under the Parol Evidence Rule, 4 J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 237, 237 n.1 
(2012); Metadata Creation, U.C. SANTA CRUZ U. LIBR., https://guides.library.ucsc.edu/ 
c.php?g=618773 (last visited Mar. 7, 2020). 
 121. Price, supra note 117, at 275–76. 
 122. Jennifer Daskal, Law Enforcement Access to Data Across Borders: The Evolving Security 
and Rights Issues, 8 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 473, 485 (2016). 
 123. Sarit K. Mizrahi, The Dangers of Sharing Cloud Storage: The Privacy Violations Suffered 
by Innocent Cloud Users During the Course of Criminal Investigations in Canada and the United 
States, 25 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 303, 320–21 (2017). 
 124. Scott A. McDonald, Authenticating Digital Evidence from the Cloud, ARMY LAW. 40, 48 
(2014). 
 125. Id. 
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the data and metadata from uploaded files could provide the government with 
an unprecedented look into someone’s life.126 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Cloud Information Should Be Secure from Warrantless Searches 
For the third-party doctrine’s voluntary element, Carpenter focused on two 
issues: (1) the essential role cell phones hold in today’s society and (2) 
Carpenter’s awareness of how his wireless carriers collected his CSLI.127  
Because cell phones are a social necessity, Carpenter explained that mere 
ownership of a cell phone does not suggest CSLI is voluntarily shared.128 
But is cloud storage necessary to engage in modern life?  It has certainly 
experienced a “wide social adoption” like cell phones.129  And much of personal 
information has shifted from personal storage to remote cloud storage.130  In fact, 
users are being forced to use cloud services because they are producing more 
data than their devices can store, and cloud storage is the best option available.131 
Moreover, the alternatives to cloud storage do not eliminate the cloud’s 
essentialness.132  Although external hard drives offer many of the same functions 
as cloud services, their accessibility is inadequate in comparison.133  External 
hard drive access is limited to the physical device itself, and generally, only one 
person can connect to the specific device.134  By contrast, many users can access 
cloud information in real-time.135 
                                                 
 126. Price, supra note 117, at 275–76. 
 127. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Park, supra note 7, at 16; Holland, supra note 2, at 73–75 (Because Carpenter does seem 
to equate total number of users with essentialness, the significant number of cloud users could be 
dispositive for this question). 
 130. Aya Hoffman, Lost in the Cloud: The Scope of the Private Search Doctrine in a Cloud-
Connected World, 68 SYRACUSE L. REV. 277, 286 (2018); Andrew Keane Woods, Against Data 
Exceptionalism, 68 STAN. L. REV. 729, 739–41 (2016). 
 131. Diamantis, supra note 36, at 503–04; Laurie Buchan Serafino, ”I Know My Rights, So 
You Go’n Need a Warrant for That”: The Fourth Amendment, Riley’s Impact, and Warrantless 
Searches of Third-Party Clouds, 19 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 154, 161 (2014). 
 132. Stalina Zoir, Cloud Storage vs External Hard Disk Drive: Which One is Better?, TECH 
RADAR (June 18, 2018), https://www.techradar.com/news/cloud-storage-vs-external-hard-disk-
drive-which-one-is-better. 
 133. Id. Lincoln Specter, Cloud Storage Alternatives: Three Ways to Sync Your Own Data 
Securely and Privately, PC WORLD (July 30, 2015), https://www.pcworld.com/article/2940646/ 
cloud-storage-alternatives-three-ways-to-sync-your-own-data-securely-and-privately.html 
(discussing other storage options). 
 134. Adam W. Snukal et al., Cloud Computing—Transcending the Cloud: A Legal Guide to 
the Risks and Rewards of Cloud Computing, Part One, 65 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 57, 58 (2011); 
Mark Wilson, Castle in the Cloud: Modernizing Constitutional Protections for Cloud-Stored Data 
on Mobile Devices, 43 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 261, 263 (2013). 
 135. Wilson, supra note 133, at 263. 
734 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 69.4:1 
Without general access, external hard drives force users to share stored data 
by email, flash drive, or using the same device.136  Imagine having to carry this 
device everywhere you went, sitting down, plugging it into your laptop, 
downloading documents from it, and then sharing those documents by email.  
Now imagine going through this process every time you needed to share files 
from your external hard drive.  This method is unrealistic in today’s world.  And 
what if the file is too large to share by email?  Gmail only allows emails to 
contain files below 25 megabytes, and most other email providers have a stricter 
data limit.137  Today’s world requires speed, access, and reliability—only the 
cloud can provide all three of these features.138  Cloud storage is not merely 
beneficial to everyday life, it is essential.139 
The second issue considers a cloud user’s awareness that their data is 
collected.  In effect, does uploading files to a cloud service create an awareness 
that this information is being collected?  People who turn over bank documents 
or make phone calls generally know that the information from their documents 
or phone numbers are collected.140   Banks and phone companies have to record 
this information for business purposes.  But other than the terms of service, there 
is no reason cloud users would know that their data is being collected.141  
Uploading files to a cloud service is like Carpenter’s act of leaving his phone 
on—neither create an awareness that companies are collecting the information 
the individual created.142  Because of the cloud’s essentialness and the user’s 
lack of awareness that their data is collected, cloud users do not voluntarily share 
their data with cloud providers. 
The third-party doctrine’s second and third elements require a third-party to 
use the information collected for business purposes.143  Depending on the terms 
of service offered by the cloud provider, the user’s data may not be “used” in the 
sense Carpenter, Miller, or Smith understood this term to mean.144  Terms of 
service define “the amount of privacy the user relinquishes”, and we must be 
careful not to conflate access with use.145  Some providers will scan uploaded 
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cloud data “for the security, stability, and control of the network”, while other 
providers will not only have access to the data but use information from this 
data.146  If cloud providers use the data pulled from uploaded files for business 
purposes, the third-party “usage” requirement would be met.147  But if the cloud 
provider simply scans the information, this element would not be satisfied. 
Carpenter’s first new factor considered the scope of the personal information 
accessed.148  At any time, a cloud user may upload and store receipts, medical 
files, personal photos, and business documents to their account.149  Although 
CSLI cannot provide specific location, metadata can.150  Both metadata and data 
can reveal a person’s “familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual 
associations.”151  And unlike CSLI, few to no inferences need to be made to 
understand this information.152  But much like the retrospective aspect of CSLI, 
even after a file is deleted, its data can remain in the cloud.153 
Carpenter’s second factor focused on the nature of the information 
accessed.154  The nature of information provided by cloud data is inherently 
sensitive and revealing, which is why storage providers offer password protected 
access and, sometimes, encryption.155  But cloud information “is an entirely 
different species of business record” than CSLI.156  CSLI cannot provide the 
type of personal information that cloud data can; cloud data can provide 
someone’s “entire digital life,” their specific location, and many other details—
all requiring few to no inferences to understand the data.157  By contrast, CSLI 
can only show someone’s location within “a half mile and two mile” radius.158  
And without inferences or other evidence, this information is useless.159 
Carpenter’s last factor examined the various technological features 
underlying the respective software.160  Some cloud providers’ terms of service 
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and software allow them to access personal cloud data.161  Terms of service can 
permit even more access, allowing for automated uploads and the “pervasive 
collection of information.”162  Either way, government access to this information 
has the power to make traditional investigative tools obsolete.163  Cloud data is 
centrally located, extensive, and requires little effort to collect.164  But most 
importantly, its access is cheap—no wiretaps, extra agents, or overtime are 
necessary to gather it—just a simple data request.165  Like Carpenter, this type 
of technology provides access to information “on a scale that was not 
technologically feasible a short while ago.”166 
Overall, cloud data shares more similarities with Carpenter than Miller or 
Smith.  Cloud storage is essential, and users are unaware that their information 
is collected after they upload files.  Thus, the voluntary element is not met.  
Depending on the terms of service, the data might not be used by the cloud 
provider.  However, most cloud services do use customers’ data for business 
purposes.167  Therefore, this element would likely be met.  Even so, the scope of 
personal cloud information and its nature are more extensive and sensitive than 
CSLI’s scope and nature.  Moreover, cloud technology mirrors the technology 
behind CSLI.168  As a result, after Carpenter, the third-party doctrine should not 
apply to cloud storage services.169 
B.  Congress’s Role 
More than 40 years ago the Supreme Court created the third-party doctrine.170  
At its inception, it was impossible for any judge—even Supreme Court 
Justices—to appreciate how society’s reliance on technology would create a 
“seismic shift” in the doctrine’s reach.171  Consider the fact that it was not until 
30 years after Miller established the third-party doctrine that cloud storage 
became commercially available.172  And by no means was its use as prevalent as 
it is today.173  The Court tried to rein in the doctrine’s reach with Carpenter; 
perhaps it did.  But until courts address warrantless searches of cloud data, it is 
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pure speculation whether this data retains Fourth Amendment protections.  To 
wait and hope for favorable application of Carpenter in these cases is to gamble 
with each individual’s cloud privacy. 
Instead, Congress needs to address cloud privacy with legislation.174  Cloud 
storage is a highly complicated area that requires a depth of fact-finding and 
deliberating not suited for the judicial system.175  Of course, Congress has not 
always been reliable at legislating technological issues, but Congress’s struggles 
should not provoke a judicial response.176 
Statutes provide much more latitude and stability than judicial precedent.177  
Statutes can require notice to the individual affected by the search, which gives 
them the ability to respond through legal channels.178  Statutes can require a 
higher standard of proof than warrants, such as clear and convincing evidence.179  
Statutes can create exceptions.  For example, national security issues are 
exempted from the SCA’s requirements.180  Finally, statutes can control the 
government’s use and storage of seized data.181  But the judiciary usually can 
only “regulate [the] acquisition of information.”182  At their core, statutes 
provide broader, more stable protections than judicial precedent.183 
Regrettably, only a small portion of cloud stored data is protected by federal 
law, specifically the SCA.184  Congress developed the SCA in the 1980s when 
commercial cloud usage was not a reality.185  As a result, Congress created a 
framework that protected the only privacy concern at the time—electronic 
communications.186 
If cloud based data does not involve electronic communications, it is not 
protected.187  Suppose you upload a spreadsheet with all your financial 
information to Dropbox—this type of information would not be protected by the 
SCA because there is no communication involved.  But if a Gmail account 
                                                 
 174. Murphy, supra note 11, at 489. 
 175. Id. at 489. 
 176. Id. at 533. 
 177. Id. at 537. 
 178. Id. at 535. 
 179. Id. at 535. 
 180. Diamantis, supra note 36, at 500; Serafino, supra note 130, at 191–92  (“FISA is 
considered exempt from the probable cause requirement because it is aimed at preventing terrorism, 
not just ordinary criminal wrongdoing.”). 
 181. Id. at 537. 
 182. Id. at 535. 
 183. Id. at 540. 
 184. Gold, supra note 5, at 2333. 
 185. 2006: Storage in the Cloud, THE STORAGE ENGINE (Sept. 11, 2015), 
https://www.computerhistory.org/storageengine/storage-in-the-cloud/. 
 186. Johnson, supra note 1, at 877. 
 187. Gold, supra note 5, at 2333. 
738 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 69.4:1 
backed up emails into Google Drive, this information would be protected.188  In 
effect, the SCA does not protect most cloud data.189 
To address cloud privacy, Congress needs to expand the SCA to protect non-
communicative cloud data.  Requiring probable cause and a warrant to access 
this information would be a welcomed change.  But the “procedural protections” 
are what matter for cloud privacy, not the document required to obtain the 
information, such as a warrant or subpoena.190  Congress should require probable 
cause and notice to acquire personal cloud data. It should also create safeguards 
to prevent the “unauthorized exposure” of data and compel its destruction after 
its use.191  Lastly, it should expand the national security exemption to cover these 
requirements.192 
The government would violate this statute if it searched a personal cloud 
account or used seized information without meeting these requirements.  The 
trigger for this statute may “over-protect [digital] records”—but it is better to 
over-protect than under-protect this type of information.193  And transparency 
and clarity are the hallmark of a well-written statute.194  Without these features, 
confusion and abuse are inevitable.195  Employing this concrete standard reduces 
the chance of either occurring.196  Some may argue that this standard is too rigid.  
But suppose law enforcement enters your house without a warrant and searches 
your desk.  Clearly, this type of entry and search is unlawful.197  Why should 
personal cloud information be any different? 
A legislative fix would also clarify this issue for defendants, prosecutors, and 
private companies.198  Defendants would know their rights; prosecutors would 
know their boundaries; and cloud providers would know when it was necessary 
to comply with the government.199  As long as this area remains unlegislated, 
companies and individuals will face expensive litigation and difficult 
decisions.200  Cloud providers do not want customers losing faith in their service, 
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which is why they are likely to oppose data requests.201  But a federal statute 
provides “legal safe harbors for compliance[,]” freeing companies from difficult 
ethical decisions and angry customers.202 
Even with a privacy statute that protects cloud information, Congress must do 
more.  Congress needs to create a law that forces it to revisit digital privacy 
statutes on a recurring basis.  Keeping pace with rapid technological changes 
will not be easy.203  Finding bipartisan support for these laws may be an even 
greater hurdle.  But with the constant evolution of technology, using 30-year-old 
statutes for digital privacy is a recipe for disaster.  With this law, Congress will 
be forced to examine digital privacy protections more than every 30 years. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Digital privacy is threatened without statutory protection.204  To be sure, the 
government should have “the appropriate legal authority to provide security” 
and fulfill its constitutional role.205  At the same time, people must maintain “a 
sufficient scope of privacy and autonomy necessary for [their] human 
dignity.”206  Here lies the inherent tension.  But the recommendations put forth 
by this paper accommodate both essential principles. 
For those that argue that these suggestions will allow people to “do things they 
shouldn’t be doing[,]” I respectfully disagree.207  The proposed statutory 
amendment “allow[s] people to live core areas of their personal lives with the 
dignity that excludes onlookers.”208  The United States is not a totalitarian 
country.209  We have always warned against oppressive behavior in the physical 
world, and the digital world should be no different.  Armed with wholesale cloud 
access, the government could “pursue personal vendettas, target the politically 
unpopular,” and trample on other civil liberties.210 
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Since 9/11, the government has received “greater investigative latitude” but 
extending this ability to warrantless searches of cloud services is unwise.211  
Although Carpenter appears to protect cloud data from warrantless searches, 
this area is still “ripe for future Supreme Court review.”212  And so, Congress 
must act. 
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